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RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THIRD 
WAY CONSTITUTIONALISM 
THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM. Stephen Gardbaum.1 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013. Pp. xii + 262. 
$99.00 (cloth), $39.99 (paper). 
Jeff King2 
In an influential article in 2001,3 Professor Stephen 
Gardbaum drew attention to a family resemblance between 
Commonwealth legal systems which offered some form of 
constitutional rights review, but within a framework that 
permitted the supremacy of the legislature. For example, Section 
33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms permits 
legislative override of the Charter by the federal or any provincial 
parliament, and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 
empowers judges to declare acts of the UK Parliament 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which leaves the impugned law on the books (sometimes for 
years). This combination of judicial review with continuing 
legislative supremacy, along with parliamentary and executive 
consideration of rights-compliance before legislation is enacted, 
has been noticed by others as well. Mark Tushnet classified such 
 1. MacArthur Foundation Professor of International Justice and Human Rights, 
UCLA School of Law. 
 2. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, University College London. The author thanks 
Nick Barber, Grégoire Webber, Tom Hickman and Stefan Theil for helpful feedback. The 
author commented on Stephen Gardbaum’s book at a seminar at the Faculty of Laws, 
University College London in June 2013, and benefitted greatly from Gardbaum’s helpful 
clarifications, as well as his exceptional collegiality in stimulating critical discussion of the 
book’s themes. 
 3. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001). 
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systems as having “weak form review,”4 and Janet Hiebert has 
dubbed them the “parliamentary model.”5 
 In this book, Gardbaum deepens his analysis of these 
systems by identifying what he regards as the main characteristics 
of this model, and presenting an elaborate normative defense of 
them. He argues that the “New Commonwealth Model” found in 
Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and Australia represents a 
normatively compelling “third way” between the strong form, or 
“court-centric” form of constitutional rights review familiar in the 
United States and Germany, and the model of parliamentary 
sovereignty, which, in its classical British form, forbids judges to 
question the validity of any act of Parliament. Gardbaum’s book 
should be of interest to American constitutional lawyers, not only 
because the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” is a perennial 
concern, and Gardbaum engages to some extent with Bickel, Ely, 
Tushnet, Ackerman and other leading American 
constitutionalists. It is also because he defends a model of judicial 
review that is a radical departure from the American brand. 
In this review essay, I illustrate how Gardbaum has 
illuminated an important phenomenon in comparative 
constitutional law. He has shown with unparalleled rigour and 
insight how the various interlocking features of the 
Commonwealth model of constitutional rights protection work, 
and has put forth a novel argument about how they ought to work. 
However, I will also argue that his exercise in theory building is 
problematic from methodological and substantive standpoints. In 
his quest to build an “internal theory of the New Model,” 
Gardbaum’s approach equivocates between describing the 
jurisdictions and prescribing how they should operate. His 
methodology of finding a third way between two schools of 
thought in British constitutional theory is marred by the failure of 
the distinction to be stable and convincing, and by the doomed 
attempt to blend irreconcilable positions about the value of 
judicial review in a rights-based democracy. 
As to substance, my key gripe is with the crucial proposal that 
legislatures should consider, but ultimately disregard, judicial 
declarations that statutes violate rights if the legislature 
reasonably disagrees with the judgment. This idea, I argue, is 
 4. MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009); see also 
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781 (2003). 
 5. Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models 
Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights? 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1963 (2004).  
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incompatible with Gardbaum’s own position about legislative 
failures to protect rights, it holds out a Panglossian hope for 
legislative cooperation, and it fails to acknowledge the very 
substantial rule of law problems we would have in a society where 
judicial decisions were treated like legal advice. 
I. AN OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
A. THE THEORY OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL 
Part I sets out the “theory” of the New Commonwealth 
Model, whereas Part II sets out the “practice,” namely, the way 
the model operates in some key jurisdictions that recently 
adopted bills of rights, including Canada (1982), New Zealand 
(1990), the United Kingdom (1998) and some Australian states 
(2004, 2006). Part I is an outline of the essential features of the 
model as Gardbaum defines it, a normative argument in defense 
of these features, and an exploration of how an ideal model ought 
to work. 
So what are these features? The model essentially has four of 
them (pp. 25ff, see also 37–46, 77–94). The first characteristic is a 
codified bill of constitutional rights. This bill can be in a written 
constitution or in statutory form provided they have “some form 
of higher law status” (pp. 35–36). For example, while the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a part of the 
entrenched Canadian constitution, the UK Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), 
and the Victorian Charter are all legislation passed through 
ordinary channels and (unlike the entrenched Canadian Charter) 
repealable under the ordinary legislative process. Even so, the 
perception in the UK is that the HRA is a “constitutional 
statute,”6 and one can suppose the same for the NZBORA. This 
means that these statutes have a more hallowed status than 
ordinary law, making them politically harder to amend or repeal, 
and possibly giving them special legal status that would allow 
them to prevail over conflicting statutes under certain 
circumstances. 
The second feature is that there is pre-enactment political 
rights review. The HRA imposes a duty on the UK Minister 
introducing a bill in Parliament to issue a formal “statement” to 
 6. On the judicial recognition of this status, see R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd.) v 
Sec’y of State for Transport [2014] U.K.S.C. 3, esp. [207]–[209].   
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Parliament that a bill complies or does not comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights (a select committee of both Houses of 
Parliament—(JCHR)), furthermore, must report to Parliament 
on the human rights implications of any bill. Gardbaum regards 
the JCHR as truly exemplary of pre-enactment political rights 
review, and this reviewer wholeheartedly agrees. The Victorian 
Charter, and NZBORA, provide similar mechanisms. The 
Canadian Charter is not accompanied by any legislatively 
formalized mechanism as such, but the administrative practice is 
to inquire thoroughly into the Charter compatibility of proposed 
legislation, sometimes with a view to “charter proofing,”7 at 
others with a good faith intention of compliance. These are all 
examples of pre-enactment political rights review, though they 
vary in quality. Gardbaum considers the Canadian approach to be 
weakest because the pre-enactment review is by the executive 
rather than the legislature8 (pp. 122–23). For this type of pre-
enactment political review to operate properly, he argues, it 
should be neither exclusively an executive nor legislative process, 
but rather both. And it should not be about averting legal risk, but 
rather be proactive and normatively wide-ranging, and thus free 
from the fetters that bind (or at least preoccupy) judges. 
The third essential feature is judicial rights review. Gardbaum 
here envisages “constitutional review” (p. 83), and beyond the 
obvious features one would expect, his theory embodies a curious 
departure from standard models. While on the one hand, he is 
opposed to interpretive judicial supremacy, on the other, he 
argues that judges should not defer to legislatures on account of 
their democratic legitimacy. “Judicial rights review should be 
respectful but unapologetic. . . . [The passive virtues] would be 
structurally misplaced and counterproductive in a system of 
penultimate judicial review” (p. 85). So judges should give their 
judgments on the merits and not drift towards “reasonableness 
review” or any other representation-reinforcing standard. Why 
would they, if the legislature can have the final word? Gardbaum 
maintains that the court’s role is nonetheless to 
inform the legislature and alert the citizenry of their rights 
concerns from a legal perspective posed by a piece of 
legislation. Here the virtues of skilled professionalism and 
judicial independence from electoral accountability within a 
 7. Michael Plaxton, Charter Proofing in Canada, 8 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 217 (2005).  
 8. He contrasts this with the UK’s executive and legislative model (pp. 193–94).  
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majoritarian political system, especially a parliamentary one, 
play their role – not by conclusively or automatically rendering 
the ultimate decision, but by bringing a perspective to bear on 
it that may otherwise not be brought (p. 84). 
This position of recommending a combination of 
“unapologetic” judicial review on the understanding that the 
legislature can merely disregard the declaration has also been 
advanced by Francesca Klug and Danny Nicol in the United 
Kingdom,9 the latter being more skeptical of courts than Klug or 
Gardbaum. Here the skeptical reader will raise an eyebrow. If the 
courts are unapologetic but the legislature compliant, the 
recommendation might make things worse. And further, there is 
no discussion of epistemic grounds for judicial restraint, despite 
this being well tilled soil in the literature on the subject in both the 
U.S. and the Commonwealth. 
The fourth, “critical, and distinctive, hybrid feature of the 
new model” is the formal legal power of legislative reconsideration 
(pp. 45, 87–94). The four legal systems he discusses all have formal 
ongoing legislative supremacy over (most) rights questions. Yet 
he argues further however that this formal power must be 
exercised from time to time if the normative arguments 
supporting the New Commonwealth Model are accepted. In his 
model, in other words, legislatures would have the last word, as a 
matter of both law and practice. None of the four systems actually 
respect the criteria/practice of legislative reconsideration as he 
sets it out. In brief, the UK and Canadian parliaments tend to 
accept or “comply” with court judgments, and the New Zealand 
and Australian ones have a paucity of caselaw and disinterested 
legislatures. 
Although Gardbaum argues in favor of legislative 
reconsideration, he regards the development of “norms of 
legitimate use” to be an urgent task, and this is an especially 
helpful part of the book. The first is procedural: “the legislature 
must engage in serious and principled reconsideration of the 
judicial decision on the rights issue”10 (p. 89). The second is 
substantive: if after careful engagement, the legislature decides it 
reasonably disagrees with the judgment, it should substitute its 
own judgment and thus affirmatively nullify or disregard the 
 9. Francesca Klug, Judicial deference under the Human Rights Act 1998, 2 EUR. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125, 131 (2003); Danny Nicol, Law and Politics after the Human Rights 
Act, 4 PUB. L. 722, 744 (2006). 
 10. He adds “respectful” as well (p. 89).  
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judgment. As he says in the discussion of Canada, “[t]he new 
model does not depend on courts exercising their power of the 
final word to defer to reasonable legislative disagreements, but on 
legislatures exercising theirs” (p. 123). 
Part I of the book situates this model within some of the 
comparative constitutional law and constitutional theory 
literature, and presents an affirmative argument in favor of it. 
Gardbaum argues that it represents a “hybrid model” between 
legislative and judicial supremacy. In a succinct passage 
encapsulating the core idea of the system, he argues that 
[t]he new model creates an institutional alternative to the 
traditional form of political constitutionalism and 
parliamentary sovereignty because it creates a different 
division between legislative and judicial power—granting 
greater power and responsibility to the courts for the 
protection of rights and a greater role for legal argument as a 
practical constraint on political decision-making (p. 44). 
Whatever critical commentary that follows below, I think this 
basic insight is correct and highly valuable, and it does apply to 
various degrees in the four jurisdictions he discusses, whether or 
not they respect the normative prescriptions he elaborates in Part 
I of the book. 
B. THE PRACTICE OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL 
Part II of the book is a valuable one hundred and twenty-
page exploration of many of the features of the four interrelated 
legal systems and how constitutional review fits within them. In 
each chapter, the basic features of the jurisdiction are outlined; it 
is explained how it operates in practice; and the jurisdiction’s law 
and practice is assessed for its fit with the New Commonwealth 
Model outlined in the first part of the book. 
The discussion of Canada is quite interesting, and Gardbaum 
is notably critical of the concept of “dialogue” between courts and 
legislatures, as well as of the arguments of Hogg, Thornton, 
Roach and others, who argue that the existence of a general 
limitations provision in Section 1 of the Charter or the remedy of 
suspending the effect of a declaration of invalidity do much work 
in curtailing judicial supremacy (pp. 118–20). I tend to agree with 
his arguments on this point. Instead, Gardbaum finds the power 
of legislative override in Section 33 to be the truly distinctive “new 
model feature” (p. 115, see generally pp. 114–21), though he also 
finds it in the Minister of Justice’s duty to report to the Canadian 
 
KING GARDBAUM REVIEW_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:08 PM 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 107 
parliament on the compliance of bills with the Charter of Rights. 
He criticizes both features for being ineffective, however: the 
reporting duty is legalistic and to date has never reported a bill as 
non-compliant, and the Section 33 override power has 
unfortunately “largely fallen into non-use”11 (p. 110). The New 
Commonwealth Model would strongly urge that it be used more 
often. 
New Zealand is the jurisdiction which comes closest to 
Gardbaum’s ideal theory, so it can be explored in a bit more 
depth. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) is a 
statutory bill of rights, as are the counter-parts in the UK and 
Australia. The NZBORA allows courts to quash executive action 
that violates any of the protected rights, but expressly states that 
courts have no power to disapply legislation and, uniquely in this 
family, provides for no expressly stated judicial power to declare 
statutes to be inconsistent with the bill of rights. The method of 
interpretation in NZBORA cases involving legislative 
infringements of rights is to (1) find the right to have been limited 
unreasonably under section 5; (2) seek to render a rights-
consistent statutory interpretation (similar to an “as applied” 
challenge in U.S. constitutional law)12 under Section 6; and, failing 
success here, (3) declare under Section 4 that the court is obliged 
to apply the statute and dismiss the claim. The effect of this 
process is that judges in effect find that statutes violate the 
NZBORA but not by way of official declaration. The result is that 
the claimant still loses the case, and Section 4 cases have less 
political salience. 
Gardbaum assesses the impact of the NZBORA on the 
legislative process along two lines. The first is pre-enactment 
legislative rights review. In sharp contrast with Canada, the 
Attorney General in New Zealand has specified 59 reports of 
inconsistency since 1990, 28 on government bills and 31 on non-
government bills (a crucial distinction in the Westminster system 
– the latter not normally expected to pass, and the Attorney 
General is a Minister who sits in the Cabinet). Of the first 22 
government bills with such reports, 19 became law without 
relevant amendments, and the non-government bills “have not 
 11. The best study I have seen on the use and origins of Section 33 is David Johansen 
and Philip Rosen, The Notwithstanding Clause of the Canadian Charter, 
PARLIAMENTARY BACKGROUND PAPER (Law and Government Division, 
Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Pub. No. BP-194-E, 2008; rev. 2012). 
 12. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) for a recent 
judicial discussion.  
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fared so well” as the government bills13 (pp. 134–35). The second 
line of assessment is the impact of judicial findings (not 
declarations) of inconsistency on legislative behavior. Gardbaum 
could find four examples of where the courts had made findings 
that were subsequently considered by Parliament. In one case 
(same sex marriage), it is unclear whether the judgment was the 
prime mover; in another (compensation rights for prisoners), the 
legislative response was part nullification; and in a further 
(availability of a public law damages for executive breaches of the 
NZBORA), the legislature let the case stand rather than affirm or 
nullify it. On my reading, it was only one of the four cases – where 
the Court of Appeal in R v Poumako14 “invited Parliament to 
reconsider” its application of retrospective penalty provisions – 
that there was any robust legislative response that would not 
otherwise have arose. Gardbaum’s defense of the record of 
impact on the legislative process is that it is “sufficiently mixed to 
belie the claim of irrelevance” (p. 149), though he also accepts it 
is “fairly minimal.” In an apparent act of alchemy, he even 
interprets the Hansen episode (pp. 142–143), where Parliament 
not only disregarded a judicial finding of inconsistency but 
extended the reach of the impugned reverse-onus measure, as an 
example that illustrates what his model commends (p. 150). 
The discussion of the United Kingdom focuses on debates in 
the UK about whether the Human Rights Act 1998 has made any 
difference (i.e., whether it was “futile”), and about the potent 
form of rights-consistent statutory interpretation under Section 3, 
as well as the impact of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on 
the legislative process. He is keen to establish that the UK system 
is “distinctive” from strong forms of judicial review, responding 
to local commentators who he regards as arguing that it is not 
strongly dissimilar. There are some methodological problems in 
this chapter concerning the collection of empirical data. On the 
number of section 3 findings that are tantamount to disapplying 
statutes, Gardbaum derives the figure of “roughly twenty uses” 
from a speculative claim by a judge that it had not been used in 
more than a dozen cases in its first five years, and by a 
constitutional law and theory scholar, Aileen Kavanagh, that it 
had been used rarely (p. 171). This is at odds with the general rigor 
elsewhere in the book, but nevertheless symptomatic of a 
weakness regarding the treatment of empirical evidence (p. 171 n. 
 13. See also Andrew Geddis, The Comparative Irrelevance of the NZBORA to 
Legislative Practice, 23 N.Z. L. REV. 465 (2009). 
 14. R v Poumako, [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA).  
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63).15 What is more engaging in Gardbaum’s discussion is his clear 
desire to see Parliament consider and disregard more judicial 
declarations of incompatibility. He argues that if Parliament 
continues to be “overly reluctant” to disagree with declarations of 
incompatibility, the wording of the Human Rights Act should be 
amended to clarify that Parliament is the supreme interpreter, for 
example by adopting the wording used in the Victorian Charter 
(pp. 201–02). 
The experience in Australia is recent, and subject to a short 
but enlightening chapter. While the federal government in 
Australia rejected a national human rights act in 2010, the 
Australian Capital Territory adopted one in 2004 and the State of 
Victoria another in 2006. The ACT Charter allows courts to issue 
declarations of incompatibility, while the Victorian Charter opts 
for the language of “declarations of inconsistency.” Both are 
functionally analogous to the UK remedy discussed above, 
though Gardbaum appears to think the text makes a principled 
difference. Whatever the principles, the practical difference is that 
courts have taken a timid approach – only one declaration has 
been issued between both jurisdictions since the adoption of the 
Charters, and it was overturned on appeal to the High Court of 
Australia. (p. 215) As Gardbaum readily acknowledges, the 
difficult issue for his theory is whether these charters, “as with 
New Zealand,” operate sufficiently distinctly from a system of 
pure legislative supremacy to fit with his model (pp. 220–21). 
C. THE BOOK’S MANY MERITS 
Gardbaum writes with admirable economy and clarity, and 
the book has a number of other outstanding merits. The first is the 
author’s exceptional sensitivity to developments and literature in 
each jurisdiction he discusses. Gardbaum’s understanding of the 
institutional characteristics of each key system, of the output of 
their courts and political actors, of the wealth of secondary 
literature, and of the interrelations between them, is unsurpassed. 
It is the culmination of over a decade of careful research into the 
 15. The problem is compounded later in the chapter when he compares the figures 
for all declarations of incompatibility in the UK with declarations of unconstitutionality 
issued by the Canadian Supreme Court alone. My own calculations, found in Jeff King, 
Parliament's Role Following Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act, 
in PARLIAMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ADDRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
(Hayley Hooper et al. eds., forthcoming from Hart Publishing), found the Canadian courts 
to issue at least three times the number, though there are further complicating factors such 
as the number of provincial legislatures in Canada.  
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area. A second noteworthy aspect was the comparison of the 
institutional features in each system. To my knowledge, this is the 
first time these have been aligned side-by-side for comparison in 
this way, and the general reader will gain a very nuanced 
understanding of all four jurisdictions after reading Part II of the 
book. The third advantage was the discussion of the role of strong 
presumptions of statutory consistency with rights, a topic 
sometimes known as “reading down statutes,” or “as applied 
challenges,” or “strong presumptions” of legislative compatibility 
with rights. Gardbaum has explored with exceptional care and 
accuracy the sovereignty implications of how judges use these 
presumptions in the UK, New Zealand, and Australia in 
particular, and reconciled that experience with the implications of 
his theory. Even better, fourthly, is the way in which he 
illuminates how the phenomenon of pre-enactment political 
rights review has operated. While I think the most illuminating 
work on this subject are deeper empirical studies, such as those 
carried out by Janet Hiebert and Hunt, Hooper and Yowell,16 
Gardbaum’s comparative and theoretical analysis alerts us to 
important nuances. A final advantage of this book is how it 
artfully pairs theoretical insight with refined understanding of 
institutional nuance, inviting favourable comparisons with writers 
such as John Hart Ely, Cass Sunstein and Alexander Bickel. 
II. CRITIQUE 
I would make four key criticisms of Gardbaum’s book, the 
first two relating to how the ideas were put across, and the second 
two with the content of the book’s key normative proposals. 
A. EQUIVOCATION ABOUT DESCRIPTION 
Gardbaum is unclear about whether the New 
Commonwealth Model is simply an account of the key features of 
the four jurisdictions, namely (1) bill of rights, (2) pre-enactment 
political rights review, (3) judicial review, and (4) legislative 
supremacy, or whether the model only includes such systems that 
 16. See, e.g., Janet L. Hiebert, Governing under the Human Rights Act: The 
Limitations of Wishful Thinking, 2012 PUB. L. 29; Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the 
Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 1 (2006); MURRAY HUNT, HAYLEY J. HOOPER & PAUL YOWELL, Parliaments and 
Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit, AHRC PUBLIC POLICY SERIES NO. 5 
(Arts & Human. Res. Council, Swindon, U.K.), 2012, available at 
http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/News-and-Events/Publications/Documents/Parliaments-and-
Human-Rights.pdf.   
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also respect what he describes as the “internal theory of the New 
Model”—namely unapologetic judicial review, legislative 
reconsideration, and so on. The difference between the two 
models is significant. Gardbaum’s book is on the one hand 
seeking to draw attention to a system and defend it as original and 
politically significant. But if we employ Gardbaum’s own theory 
as set out in this book, all four jurisdictions fail to respect this ideal 
in quite significant ways. So one does not know, when Gardbaum 
says the experiment “is working,” whether he means “it would 
work if the jurisdictions did what I recommend they do.” 
This issue is best understood by considering an example. One 
of many is the discussion of how the Canadian system 
“institutionalizes the new model”: 
[T]he [Canadian] Charter institutionalizes the new model 
through the pre-enactment reporting duty and section 33. . . . 
However, neither is operating satisfactorily or distinctly. 
Section 33 . . . is suffering from a serious practical problem due 
to its near non-use. . . . The same [problem] also occurs at the 
pre-enactment stage, where executive . . . and legal . . . review 
tend to predominate (pp. 127–28). 
The reader is puzzled—on the assumption that 
“institutionalize” means “give effect to,” this passage sends a 
rather mixed message. Are they institutionalized or not? And is 
what institutionalized? Formal legislative supremacy, or a 
practice of reasonable disagreement? Which, in other words, is 
the “model”? This equivocation is found in other parts of the 
book as well. Notably, the “case” for the New Commonwealth 
Model is set out in chapter 3, prior to the “internal theory” of the 
model in chapter 4, where he expounds the various norms. Yet in 
reality, the “case” for the Model defends the acceptability of the 
systems in terms that must respect the norms he sets out in chapter 
4—the two are in reality a continuous normative argument for a 
system that departs in important ways from the jurisdictions he 
examines. This book is better read as this normative argument. 
Yet the author wants to have things both ways, by claiming 
simultaneously to describe and justify a practice, implying that it 
only needs tinkering at the margins to fully respect the ideal it 
implicitly subscribes to. But the required tinkering is more 
fundamental than marginal, and there is no evidence that the 
jurisdictions actually subscribe to the principles he identifies. 
Indeed, on my understanding, the evidence from Canada is that 
Section 33 was never intended to be used regularly, and likewise 
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with Section 4 of the UK Human Rights Act, as the White Paper 
made amply clear.17 
Sometimes Gardbaum claims that the “essential features” of 
the model are derived from the legal systems he describes (pp. 1–
2, see also pp. 8ff, especially pp. 10–16), and he is, throughout Part 
II in particular, concerned with the question of fit. Yet at others, 
he candidly admits that the various systems often fail to live up to 
how the theory he announces is “supposed to work.” After 
clarifying that neither Canada, nor Australia, nor the UK 
effectively respect the crucial criteria of legislative 
reconsideration, he claims that New Zealand, “although certainly 
not ideal, especially in terms of the quality of legislative rights 
deliberation . . . still seems to be a fairly good example of how the 
new model is supposed to work” (p. 229). But the gap prompts a 
hard question: why call it the “New Commonwealth Model” if it 
does not in fact describe those jurisdictions? The problem is not 
just with legislative reconsideration, either. The pre-enactment 
rights review varies considerably in quality and character, and in 
none of these four jurisdictions is there anything like 
“unapologetic” judicial review. Democratic legitimacy is an 
omnipresent consideration conditioning the judicial role in the 
jurisprudence of these four jurisdictions. 
In a section in chapter 9 Gardbaum asks whether the new 
model “is operating” in a distinct, intermediate manner, and lists, 
with admirable rigour and fairness, the many obstacles to the view 
that it is. One wishes he had concluded the section with “no, it 
isn’t,” and moved on. But that conclusion may have necessitated 
some invasive surgery elsewhere in the book. Indeed, the next 
section is entitled “Normative promise fulfilled?” and the answer 
would have been brief if the conclusion was that the model was 
not observed. But in this same section he claims that to some 
extent it has been, before concluding that “the NZBORA is 
operating in the most distinctly new model way, [but is] still far 
from the ideal described in Chapter 4” (p. 233). The Section 33 
power of legislative override in Canada’s system, the essential 
“new model feature,” you may recall, is acknowledged as having 
 17. On Canada, this is the clear conclusion of Johansen and Rosen, supra note 11, 
though that was the dominant rather than exclusive view; and for the United Kingdom, 
this is the explicit statement in the White Paper introducing the Human Rights Bill to 
Parliament: ‘2.10 A declaration that legislation is incompatible with the Convention rights 
will not of itself have the effect of changing the law, which will continue to apply. But it 
will almost certainly prompt the Government and Parliament to change the law.’ RIGHTS 
BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL 1997 (CM 3782, 1997).  
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the “practical problem” of not being used (p.127). These sound 
like evasive ways of saying “no,” but they also further complicate 
the message about what precisely the New Model is—what is 
actually occurring, or Gardbaum’s theory of what should occur. 
B. METHODOLOGY OF THE THIRD WAY AND THE BLENDING 
OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
But perhaps we should interpret the book as a program for 
reforming these jurisdictions, instead of describing them? This 
leads me to some problems with the methodology. The 
methodology that anchors the normative program is plain and 
repeated often: Gardbaum is “blending,” “mixing,” in the attempt 
to “combine and accommodate” two competing views, to create a 
“hybrid” theory that represents a “third way” or a “new third 
option” between the two poles, “the constitutionalist equivalent 
of the mixed economy” (pp. 34, 64, 67, 232). There is nothing 
inherently wrong with such an approach, of course. Yet the 
slogans alone evoke the fear that it might too easily seek a 
compromise between incompatible positions. And the fear is well 
placed. 
The jurisdictional blending is an issue I have addressed 
above. But the principal objects of the blending in this book are 
the pros and cons of two schools of thought in British legal 
academia known as political and legal constitutionalism. “Political 
constitutionalism” earned its label from the important Chorley 
Lecture given by Professor John Griffith at the London School of 
Economics in 1978, and published the following year in the 
Modern Law Review.18 Griffith’s was a claim that the UK 
constitution is largely shaped by political actors, and that judges 
play a minor role in articulating or enforcing its rules. He also 
criticized liberal forms of constitutionalism that sought to elevate 
principles and rights above the fray of politics. He was a political 
pluralist, most admirably described by Graham Gee as having an 
“agonistic” conception of politics,19 one who thought that in the 
field of constitutional politics there was nothing but disagreement, 
and that liberal human rights principles such as those found in the 
ECHR were “the statement of a political conflict pretending to be 
 18. J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1979); see also 
Graham Gee and Grégoire C. N. Webber, What is a Political Constitution?, 30 OXFORD 
J.L. STUD. 273 (2010). 
 19. Graham Gee, The Political Constitutionalism of J.A.G. Griffith, 28 L. STUD. 20 
(2007).  
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a resolution of it.”20 Griffith, unlike some subsequent political 
constitutionalists, but compatible with the Marxist critique of 
bourgeois rights, was a rights-sceptic about both rights-rhetoric as 
well as judicial enforcement. His theory was pregnant with a 
critique of courts, and in his classic book The Politics of the 
Judiciary,21 he sets out that normative case in polemical terms. But 
he claimed his project was more descriptive than normative. 
The theory received its more explicit normative cast by 
subsequent writers, notably Adam Tomkins, and especially 
Richard Bellamy, whose book Political Constitutionalism is the 
most theoretically sophisticated version.22 In this cast, the 
advocates of the theory generally adopt Jeremy Waldron’s 
argument (which is more similar to Griffith’s than has been 
generally noticed) that in a society like Britain or the U.S., where 
there is general respect for people’s basic rights, but reasonable 
disagreement over their meaning, considerations of political 
equality support assigning interpretive authority to legislatures 
rather than courts.23 Furthermore, the argument runs, there are no 
strong instrumentalist or outcome-related arguments in favor of 
judicial interpretation.24 To the contrary, the record suggests that, 
in America at least, judicial review has been at least as negative 
as positive, and, furthermore, the form of reasoning adopted by 
courts is unduly legalistic and pedantic, rather than institutionally 
and normatively wide-ranging as moral argument should be. 
The other school of thought is “legal constitutionalism,” one 
whose basic feature is confidence in the capacity of judicially 
enforced principles and rights to help sustain a rights-based 
democracy. Legal constitutionalism is a label and refined category 
invented by (later) political constitutionalists to describe their 
intellectual enemies,25 and a few legal scholars have accepted the 
challenge and adopted the label.26 It is in my view perhaps 
 20. Griffith, supra note 18, at 14. 
 21. J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977). 
 22. ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005); RICHARD 
BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007). 
 23. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
 24. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 
1346, 1376–86 (2006). In LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 252–54 Waldron 
rejected the conceptual plausibility of instrumentalist arguments in favor of judicial review. 
 25. A clear exposition of it and its chief tenets is found in TOMKINS, supra note 22, 
at 11. Extremely few jurists, in my view, subscribe strongly to the six tenets he outlines. 
 26. Paul P. Craig, Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in EFFECTIVE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 19 (Christopher Forsyth, 
Mark Elliott, Swati Jhaveri, Anne Scully-Hill, Michael Ramsden, eds., 2010); Tom R. 
Hickman, In Defence of the Legal Constitution, 55 U. TORONTO. L.J. 981 (2005).  
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unfortunate, but at any rate those who accept the label 
nonetheless refashion the definition such that it is a more accurate 
portrayal of the more common view and bears little resemblance 
to the one created by the political constitutionalists as a foil.27 The 
people charged as legal constitutionalists by writers such as 
Tomkins, Poole and others, are not mere apologists for judicial 
review, oblivious to the political side of the constitution, and 
critics of the regulatory state. To the contrary, their writings in my 
view often betray less preoccupation with courts than do those of 
many of the modern political constitutionalists.28 British public 
lawyers, such as Jeffrey Jowell, Paul Craig, Dawn Oliver, Aileen 
Kavanagh, and the all-time favorite, Ronald Dworkin, have been 
identified as legal constitutionalists. 29 True, they do support what 
in Britain can be regarded as a strong judicial role in the 
protection of human rights (though something that would be 
unrecognizably timid in the United States, Germany or India). 
Yet they are hardly opponents of the basic welfare and regulatory 
state in the way the charge of “liberal-legalism” makes out,30 nor 
are their writings insensitive to the role of Parliament and 
administration. Beyond their support for judicial review in some 
form, there is no commonality beyond this, neither in the view 
that judges have the common law power to disregard statutes, nor 
that we should have an entrenched bill of rights rather than the 
repealable Human Rights Act 1998, nor that judges should not 
give democratic legitimacy great weight in adjudication.31 Above 
all there is certainly nothing to suggest in this British debate that 
there is any ignorance of the overwhelmingly important role 
 27. See Craig, supra note 26; Hickman, supra note 26. 
 28. Nearly half of Paul Craig’s ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 7th 
ed. 2012) is about administration rather than judicial control, whereas Jeffrey Jowell’s LAW 
AND BUREAUCRACY: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL 
ACTION (1976) concerned both judicial restraint and was an empirical study of 
adjudication involving participant observation in welfare decision-making. Dawn Oliver 
has edited several books on the UK Parliament and the law, as well as on the regulatory 
state, and she sat on the Royal Commission for the Reform of the House of Lords 
(Wakeham Commission), which reported to Parliament in 2000. 
 29. TOMKINS, supra note 22, at 11.  
 30. Adam Tomkins, In Defence of the Political Constitution, 22 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 
157 (2002). 
 31. CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH (ED.), JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2000) (demonstrating that writers such as Paul Craig and T.R.S. Allan agree that the 
authority for judicial review of executive action is derived from the common law rather 
than statute, but disagree strongly about whether the common law must respect the 
sovereignty of Parliament); Dawn Oliver, Parliament and the Courts: a Pragmatic (or 
Principled) Defence of the Sovereignty of Parliament, in PARLIAMENT AND THE LAW 
(Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry, & Dawn Oliver eds., 2013); Aileen Kavanagh, Judicial 
Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 23 (2010).  
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played in the constitution by a (sovereign) Westminster 
Parliament.32 I might add, too, that although political 
constitutionalism is a more coherent doctrinal position (having 
been defined by people who believe in it), there is also interesting 
work exploring its own nuances and internal differences.33 
One can thus see that a normative argument based upon 
blending these two schools of thought will be on a perilous 
journey. We can turn now to Gardbaum’s general definition of the 
two positions: 
Roughly speaking, political constitutionalism stands for the 
proposition that the limits on governmental power inherent in 
the concept of constitutionalism – limits that qualify the noun 
in the term “constitutional democracy” – and especially those 
that are expressed in terms of individual rights and liberties, 
are or should be predominantly political in nature, enforced 
through the ordinary mechanisms of Madisonian-style 
structural constraints and especially, through electoral 
accountability. [. . .] By contrast, legal constitutionalists believe 
that these limits in general, and rights in particular, are or 
should be predominantly legal in nature and enforced through 
the power of courts to disapply acts that exceed them (p. 22). 
This definition prompts the following objection: can one not 
believe that political protections do and ought to predominate in 
constitutional practice, while at the same time support 
constitutional judicial review in either restricted UK form or even 
strong form, as in Germany and America? The answer is surely 
yes. Even Dworkin took that view,34 and the definition here ill 
suits several hardly-marginal writers who support a quite 
attenuated, politically sensitive role for constitutional 
adjudication,35 as well as for those avowed political 
 32. The one (outstanding) exception to this claim is the work of Professor T.R.S. 
Allan at Cambridge. Professor Allan’s work is profound and important, but not 
representative of even a majority of those who favor constitutional judicial review. See 
T.R.S. ALLAN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW (2013). 
 33. See Gee & Webber, supra note 18; Marco Goldoni, Two Internal Critiques of 
Political Constitutionalism, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 926 (2012). 
 34. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 27 (1985) (“If all political power 
were transferred to judges, democracy and equality of political power would be destroyed. 
But we are now considering only a small and special class of political decisions.”).  
 35. There are many: JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN 
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004) ; CONOR 
GEARTY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (2005); Rosalind Dixon, A 
New Theory of Charter Dialogue: The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue and 
Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235 (2009); AILEEN KAVANAGH,  
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constitutionalists who see human rights adjudication in weak form 
systems not having strong legislative reconsideration as 
potentially compatible with their position.36 In my view, the better 
approach here is to avoid the generalizations and keep 
disagreements focused on meaningful areas of dispute. 
Gardbaum can parry here by justly claiming that whatever 
the issue with labels, he has focused the discussion by outlining 
the distinct pros and cons he associates with each school of 
thought. Political constitutionalism has two strengths, which for 
ease of reference for the remainder of this essay I will set off as 
such (pp. 51–61)37: 
(PC1) parliamentary sovereignty permits a system that is 
“ultimately within the scope of the democratic principles 
of equal participation”; and 
(PC2) legislators are better moral reasoners because they 
are not distracted by text, precedent etc. 
But it also has weaknesses: 
(PC3) legislatures are prone to pathologies and blind 
spots, such as the problem of political inertia, attending 
to minorities, and so on; and 
(PC4) rights are better protected by courts because 
“legislative deliberation and political accountability are 
insufficient to ensure that burdened individuals are 
provided with the reasonable justification to which they 
are entitled.” 
Each claim is problematic, however. In my view, the PC1 
claim is not only dependent on a Waldronian view that, as often 
pointed out, neither accounts adequately for the problem of 
majoritarian legislative bias, nor explains why representative 
democracy is more egalitarian than populist measures such as 
ballot initiatives and referenda.38 It is also in tension with 
Gardbaum’s own views of legislative defects. The claim at PC2 is 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2009); Alison Young, 
Is Dialogue Working under the Human Rights Act 1998?, 2011 PUB. L. 773 [hereinafter Is 
Dialogue Working]; Alison Young, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT (2008). 
 36. See, e.g., Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act, 
9 I.CON 86 (2011). 
 37. This is the core of his discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both political 
and legal constitutionalism. 
 38. I address these arguments more fully in ch.6 of JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL 
RIGHTS (2012), but similar criticisms can be found in the work of Ronald Dworkin, 
Dymitrios Kyritsis, and Aileen Kavanagh.  
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suspect too. The claim that parliamentarians are less fettered by 
text, etc., is at stark odds with the attitudinal model which finds it 
is almost impossible to find doctrinal constraints in the 
jurisprudence of some top courts, notably the U.S. Supreme 
Court.39 The proportionality test, looking to Canada and Europe, 
is hardly a restrictive normative exercise.40 On the other hand, 
PC3, a claim I tend to agree with, is ordinarily met with the 
following reply—legislative pathologies may exist, but they are 
unavoidable, less problematic and less illegitimate problems than 
those generated by judicial meddling.41 And PC4 is a curious 
statement, with apologies to Matthias Kumm. Of course the 
enacted law was accompanied by a public justification, it was the 
protracted procedure known as the legislative process. The idea 
that every citizen is owed an individualized justification on the 
record in the courthouse seems to me neither persuasive nor 
sustainable. The bald acceptance at PC4, moreover, that 
legislative sovereignty under-enforces rights will (or ought to) be 
untenable to political constitutionalists, who have tended to deny 
it in strong terms,42 and the claim is not backed up here by any 
evidence. 
The fatal problem in my view is that PC1 and PC3 are 
mutually incompatible. It cannot be said that legislative 
supremacy “respects democratic principles of equal 
participation” while also conceding that it is ridden with 
pathologies that disadvantage some people systematically. Where 
the systematic disadvantage starts, the egalitarianism stops. So 
much is conceded by both Waldron and Bellamy, and their 
argument upon such concession switches to a different one – that 
courts are no adequate remedy for the legislative flaw.43 
Legal constitutionalism, in this dialectic of arguments, is also 
problematic. Its two advantages are said to be as follows: 
(LC1) it fosters public recognition and consciousness of 
rights, through the announcement in a bill of rights; 
 39. JEFFREY A. SEAGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 40. GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE 
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS (2009). 
 41. See generally BELLAMY, supra note 22, at ch. 3. 
 42. The usual cite here is to GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008). See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 22, at 
95–97, and the vast literature I explore more generally in KING, supra note 38, at chapter 
3. Indeed, the leitmotif of the functionalist school of public law is that judicial review has 
been corrosive of good administration. 
 43. BELLAMY, supra note 22, at 26–48; Waldron, supra note 24, at 1404.  
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(LC2) it can correct for legislative pathologies and 
blindspots, and correct the legislative under-enforcement 
of rights, by prompting legislators to use their 
deliberative capacity to evaluate concrete cases at the 
behest of adjudicators who are not electorally 
accountable at the ballot box (and are hence “politically 
independent” in this particular way). 
Yet the disadvantages are noteworthy as well: 
(LC3) courts will over-enforce constitutional limits, 
Lochner-style, by impeding progressive legislative 
change with conservative judicial rulings; 
(LC4) courts can become the primary expositors of rights 
in society, allowing legislators’ rights sensibilities to 
wither. 
The political constitutionalist will doubt the political 
invigoration resulting from a bill of rights, but also point out that 
we could adopt a non-justiciable bills of rights. And the judicial 
ability to correct for legislative pathologies (LC2), as the political 
constitutionalist will argue, must be better than what legislatures 
can achieve, net of the costs of judicial over-enforcement (PC4). 
That courts will over-enforce constitutional rights is the flip side 
of the claim (PC4) that legislatures under-enforce them. The legal 
constitutionalist, for her part, can say there is really very little 
evidence of over-enforcement in Britain and Canada, where the 
system works similar to a stronger style of judicial review. 
Lochner happened in the U.S., a century ago.44 Unfortunately, we 
simply cannot square these competing claims in the realm of 
theory. They do not compute. We need recourse to some rigorous 
empirical studies. This is a problem in chapter 3, because it is 
entirely concerned with responding to assertions in constitutional 
theory literature when the questions of impact seem critical to the 
overall argument. 
Of course, Gardbaum cannot be faulted for not addressing 
every counter-argument. It would disrupt the great flow of the 
 44. The Canadian decision of Chaoulli v Quebec (AG) [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 is a 
potential counter-example. See Sujit Choudry, Worse than Lochner?, in ACCESS TO CARE, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL DEBATE OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN 
CANADA (Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., 2005); cf. Jeff King, 
Constitutional Rights and Social Welfare: A Comment on the Canadian Chaoulli Health 
Care Decision 69 MOD. L. REV. 631 (2006). In the result, Chaoulli was largely ignored: 
Daniel Cohn, Chaoulli Five Years On: All Bark and No Bite?, (Working Paper presented 
to The Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2010), available at 
www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Cohn.pdf.   
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book if he did, and indeed it may have distracted him from 
expounding the features of the New Model systems. But on the 
other hand, when these arguments are meant to anchor the quite 
radical proposals of “no judicial deference” and “vigorous 
legislative reconsideration,” neither of which is actually found in 
the practice of these four jurisdictions, one is left wanting more. 
My sense is that the foundations of this theory are based on 
positions that are clearly rejected by adherents of both schools he 
tries to combine, and they are not reconcilable either. Someone 
must be wrong. Perhaps in future work Gardbaum will explore in 
greater detail why some of those positions were wrong, or why it 
is, in fact, and contrary to all expectations, possible to reconcile 
them. 
C. THE VIABILITY OF THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG 
LEGISLATIVE RECONSIDERATION 
My primary misgiving with the book is with its proposal that 
legislatures should disregard judicial declarations of rights in a de 
rigueur fashion. Gardbaum asserts that this criteria “permits the 
new model to neutralize legal constitutionalism’s democratic 
legitimacy problem” (p. 68). When outlining this feature in 
greater detail in chapter 4, he recalls that the case against judicial 
finality is that judicial reasoning is too legalistic (PC2), and also 
suggests, in different wording, that the ongoing and regularly 
asserted legislative supremacy “can also satisfy more general 
criteria of political legitimacy” (p. 89), by which he presumably 
means political equality. But he introduces another novel 
argument, namely, that the pathologies “can be countered by less 
restrictive procedural and/or substantive constraints on outcomes 
than a full judicial veto” (p. 89). 
The large and unanswered question is, why should we expect 
the legislative pathologies Gardbaum highlights to be cured when 
the issue returns to Parliament and it is invited to disagree with 
the court? Gardbaum evidently believes that the two norms he 
commends for the exercise of this power of legislative 
reconsideration – good faith legislative engagement with the 
court’s reasoning, and disagreement only if the legislature 
reasonably disagrees – are going to be potent restraints on 
legislative behavior. It is an open question whether the first even 
could be a restraint. I am not certain that one can realistically 
expect parliamentarians to routinely debate the merits of legal 
reasoning. The Hansard I have reviewed, and all other studies on 
the UK Parliament’s consideration of judicial decisions under the 
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Human Rights Act 1998, suggests that parliamentarians are 
singularly uninterested in the reasoning of the courts, even when 
they agree with the judgments.45 (That is not to say that 
parliamentary reasoning on the rights issues themselves is poor – 
I speak only of engagement with the judgment). Part of the reason 
is that Members of Parliament tend to think judgments are 
specialist law, and are outside their comfort zone. Another, quite 
serious reason is that some Members or Peers regard it as an 
affront to judicial independence to challenge the reasoning of 
judges. Another, more logistical reason, is that some judgments 
are often long, more often boring, and it isn’t clear that busy 
parliamentarians with many irons in the fire are going to want to 
pore over the particulars of the judgments they are anyway 
welcome to ignore. Contrary to what lawyers may like to think, 
the experience in the UK has been that most declarations of 
incompatibility, which all but automatically come up for 
parliamentary consideration, have had a very “low profile” in 
Parliament.46 This is because the issues have tended, in the UK at 
any rate, to be comparatively minor next to the major battles 
fought in other legislation, or even in the same legislation into 
which the remedial provision is inserted. 
Let’s assume, however optimistically, that Gardbaum is right 
that many of these problems could be overcome, and we could get 
Parliament to engage with the reasoning of the courts. This may 
well be an attractive idea, and a strength of this book is certainly 
its grasp of the institutional dynamics. The greater problem is with 
the idea that a standard of “reasonable disagreement” will do any 
work in disciplining the legislature’s rejection of judicial decisions. 
The standard might have done some work if the parliament was 
entitled only to nullify the judgment if it thought the judgment 
was unreasonable. One could plausibly see the UK Parliament, for 
instance, only resolving on rare occasions that a judgment of the 
UK Supreme Court was unreasonable, even if it would be minded 
to disagree with it more often. But that is not what Gardbaum 
commends. His test is whether the legislature has its own 
reasonable judgment that is nonetheless at odds with the court's 
(perhaps reasonable) judgment. So the question is, when is the 
legislature going to conclude a debate in which it resolves that it 
 45. King, supra note 15; see also Young, Is Dialogue Working, supra note 35, at 783–
84; ARUNA SATHANAPALLY, BEYOND DISAGREEMENT: OPEN REMEDIES IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 138–39 (2012);  
 46. Sathanapally, supra note 45, at 138–39; King, supra note 15, at the text 
accompanying note 87 (giving examples).   
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disagrees with the reasoning of the court, but believes that its own 
opinion is unreasonable? Of course, never. If not, then how is the 
practice of judicial review meant to overcome the legislative 
pathologies and blind spots? It may help with the logistical ones 
(the burdens of inertia), by drawing Parliament’s attention to the 
issue and prompting a response. But what of the really pressing 
concern that Gardbaum acknowledges as part of the case for 
judicial review in the first place (PC3/LC2), namely, the 
“sensitivity to the rights . . . of various electoral minorities - 
whether criminal defendants, asylum-seekers, or minority racial, 
ethnic or religious groups . . . .” (p. 54)? I am doubtful that the 
rule of legislative reconsideration, including the two normative 
guidelines outlined by Gardbaum, would extend real protection 
to these groups. Indeed, his candid admission that PC3 is a real 
problem appears to me inconsistent with the proposed solution. 
And the different track records evident in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom appear to be to be partially, if not primarily, a 
result of the perceived obligation to respond.47 If the reply here is 
that it is expected that legislatures will just agree with the court’s 
decision most of the time, I feel that is counter-intuitive and the 
evidence for it is slim. 
One is tempted to say that this is a minor flaw. But if we 
remove Gardbaum’s specific rule of legislative reconsideration, 
we also need to let go of his proposal for “unapologetic” judicial 
review. And since the pre-enactment rights review he discusses is 
probably compatible with strong form systems of judicial review, 
what remains is a system that differs considerably from 
Gardbaum’s New Commonwealth Model. It is important to 
recognize as well that there are many reasons one might support 
a system of weak form review without a regular practice of 
legislative reconsideration. Under such a system, the legislature 
enjoys ongoing legal authority to disagree with the courts and in 
some systems to repeal the bill of rights—both of which are quite 
meaningful powers. Yet Gardbaum wants much more 
disagreement. He regards his model as being close to what 
prevails in New Zealand, where the two local commentators 
observe that “the impact of the NZBORA on Parliament’s 
behavior is so minimal in nature as to be almost irrelevant” and 
 47. I discuss this obligation and adduce statements in the UK Parliament above in 
King, supra note 15.  
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that the Act results in “very limited insurance for rights 
protection” (p. 145).48 
D. THE RULE OF LAW AND COURTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADVISERS 
My final misgiving is about the rule of law and the authority 
of law in the brave new world of the ideal theory Gardbaum sets 
out. He envisages a constitutional system in which judicial 
declarations of rights are politely acknowledged and duly set 
aside. The idea that a court could merely provide an opinion that 
can be accepted or ignored—like the advice of a law officer—
misconceives the nature of legal authority in the modern state. 
More importantly, it sends a mixed message to citizens about the 
scope of their rights under constitutional law. This view can be 
called the “courts as legal advisers” view. 
In his excellent book, Public Law and the Human Rights Act, 
Tom Hickman considers a variety of such views, which he dubs 
the “principle–proposing” model of dialogue.49 Some of these 
views, those of Klug and Nicol, have already been addressed 
above. Hickman rejects these views because they are 
incompatible with the proper constitutional role of the judiciary. 
Courts should hear arguments, not advance them to the legislative 
branches. I agree with Hickman’s conclusions about the 
proposal’s poor fit with current constitutional orthodoxy, but 
want to push on to argue why this constitutional orthodoxy should 
not be reconfigured in the way Gardbaum envisages. 
To be clear, his view is not the same as, for instance, asking a 
court to declare the existence of constitutional convention 
without enforcing it.50 The politicians can abide the convention or 
not, but they cannot in my view turn around and say the court was 
wrong about its existence. Its existence was settled by the 
judgment. Nor is Gardbaum’s proposed role for courts similar to 
the practice in some advisory opinions of declaring legal 
principles (or rules) to exist without enforcing them.51 In such 
cases, the courts do not suggest such principles are “negotiable.” 
 48.  Citing Geddis, supra note 13, at 471; James B. Kelly, Judicial and Political Review 
as Limited Insurance: The Functioning of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in ‘Hard’ 
cases, 49 COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 295, 296 (2011). 
 49. TOM HICKMAN, PUBLIC LAW AFTER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 83–87 (2010). 
 50. Reference re a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 
(Supreme Court of Canada). 
 51. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Supreme Court of 
Canada).  
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By contrast, under the New Commonwealth Model, a person 
could fight her case up to the Supreme Court to obtain something 
declaratory of nothing more than an opinion. What does she get 
from court here? A view? Have her rights been violated or not, 
after the Supreme Court says so? These are not minor matters, 
and a patient citizen’s tour through dialogue theory or the 
Waldronian line on reasonable disagreement will generate 
confusion (I have tried). Strategically, furthermore, people would 
have to look well past the courts when contemplating litigation. 
Impact litigation to help improve minority rights would have to 
reckon with the possibility that the legislature might even use the 
occasion raised by an adverse ruling to roll back protection even 
further. This could disincentivize resort to litigation, which would 
undo the supposed “hybrid” benefits of the model. 
What I see as most problematic is the constitutional position 
of the courts. Without a norm requiring the legislature to not 
depart from judicial findings lightly, the courts will know that to 
issue judgments that will be ignored will undermine their 
credibility and thus institutional integrity.52 It will ultimately result 
in an exercise of brinksmanship in which one of the two sides will 
back down—presumably the courts. That would undermine the 
very benefits of judicial review in the first place, and make 
“unapologetic” judicial review rather unlikely. 
This gives occasion to comment on a debate at present in the 
United Kingdom, which is about whether Parliament should feel 
it appropriate to disregard declarations of incompatibility under 
the Human Rights Act 1998. The working presumption now is 
that it should not.53 It ought to respond. But respond how? Should 
it always amend or repeal the law, or could it, for instance, 
respond by reaffirming the law by way of resolution? Either 
interpretation is plausible. My own view is that if Parliament 
regularly refused to repeal the impugned laws they would disrupt 
the constitutional arrangements put into place under the Human 
Rights Act 1998. It is true that Parliament has the clear legal 
authority to disregard a declaration. And it is clearly foreseen that 
it would be possible for it to do so in particular circumstances. No 
one has as yet outlined what such circumstances should be, 
because until the prisoner voting saga few thought that 
 52. Some feared that this would occur in the UK, since the UK Parliament can not 
only ignore judicial decisions but must act affirmatively to remedy the incompatibility. It 
is not clear that it happened, has but the point is arguable. 
 53. King, supra note 15.  
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Parliament would disregard a declaration of incompatibility.54 I 
would argue that such circumstances would need to be highly 
unusual: it should be on an issue where Parliament has engaged 
directly and at some length with the key issue, and where the law’s 
amendment or repeal would have an adverse effect upon a very 
substantial number of people in the society, and where the 
exercise is perceived to be exceptional rather than the dawn of a 
new practice of disagreement. If the legislature wishes to feel 
unbound, it should rather repeal the Human Rights Act 1998. To 
treat declarations as negotiable is to belie the objective of the Act 
when it was introduced, which was to provide a remedy in 
domestic courts for violations of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The better approach, and one observed by the 
governments and parliaments in the UK thus far, is to consider 
that so long as the Act remains in place, the presumption is that 
Parliament will amend the laws found incompatible. Should the 
courts’ role under this arrangement be viewed as undesirable, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 should be repealed. 
To be clear, the argument is not merely an interpretation of 
the purpose of the Act. There are compelling reasons of 
constitutional principle as well. To permit a declaration of 
incompatibility without any regular presumption of 
parliamentary action removing the incompatibility would be a 
cruel waste of time and money for litigants and defeat the good 
purpose of the Act, which was to provide claimants with real 
rather than illusory remedies in English courts for violations of 
their Convention rights. Although this analysis is limited to the 
situation in the UK, I believe that similar reasoning applies in 
respect of Section 33 in Canada. As noted above, in both 
jurisdictions, the intention upon introduction of these novel 
features was that they would be used, if at all, only in extremely 
rare circumstances. 
In my view, Gardbaum’s proposal stems from an attempt to 
have things both ways by hybridizing two views, neither of which 
had the authority problem to which I am drawing attention here. 
Supporters of judicial review may disagree strongly with each 
other about how much restraint judges should show to legislators. 
But they all agree that judicial decisions should be respected and 
observed. And Waldron, Bellamy, and Tomkins all make 
 54. This is a moving target but most of the background can be found in Ian White, 
Prisoners’ Voting Rights (SN/PC/01764) (London, Parliament and Constitution Centre, 
House of Commons Library, 15 May 2013) and R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice; 
McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2013] UKSC 63.  
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arguments about assigning clear interpretive authority to 
legislatures rather than courts. Gardbaum’s theory would create 
a “dispersal of responsibility” (p. 68) for decision-making about 
rights between these authorities, but in so doing, he forgets that if 
these rights are to be law, we are entitled to expect authoritative 
legal ruling on their scope. I would regret to see judicial decisions 
become mere advice. I would prefer a form of judicial rights 
review that gives weight to the various valid concerns raised in this 
excellent book, urging judges to defer in appropriate cases to 
parliament, and, where judges perform within the role set out for 
them in the bill of rights, for parliament to return the favor. 
 
 
